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IF IT QUACKS LIKE A DUCK:  REVIEWING 
HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS’ SPEECH 
RESTRICTIONS UNDER THE FIRST PRONG 
OF CENTRAL HUDSON 
SHAWN L. FULTZ  
The First Amendment protects the speech of health care providers. This 
protection can limit states’ abilities to protect patients from harmful therapies 
involving speech, such as sexual orientation change efforts.  Because 
providers’ speech is more similar to commercial speech than traditional 
political discourse, it is possible to create a First Amendment review analysis 
that better balances states’ police powers with providers’ First Amendment 
rights.  Under a “single-prong” approach, the first prong of Central Hudson 
can be used to identify quackery, which is analogous to false or misleading 
commercial speech and would therefore be outside the protection of the First 
Amendment.  Because health care must be tailored to individual patients, 
restrictions on speech that survive the first prong of Central Hudson would be 
subject to strict scrutiny in order to leave the therapeutic decision to the provider 
and her patient, and maintain consistency with current jurisprudence. 
This Comment examines litigation from California’s attempted ban on 
sexual orientation change therapy to illustrate the conflicts created by the 
current approach to First Amendment review of health care provider speech.  
This Comment then demonstrates the benefit of the proposed single-prong 
approach, including how it simultaneously protects patients from harm while 
protecting health care providers’ speech. 
                                                          
  J.D. Candidate, May 2015, American University Washington College of Law, 
M.P.H. Behavioral and Community Health Sciences, May 2000, University of Pittsburgh 
Graduate School of Public Health, M.D., May 1997, University of Pittsburgh School of 
Medicine, B.S. Premedicine, May 1993, Pennsylvania State University.  Thanks to Jarred 
Reiling, Randolph Kline, and Professor Jamin Raskin for listening to early versions of 
my thesis, identifying gaps, and pushing me towards a more coherent argument. 
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“I felt dirty about [my homosexual orientation].  I felt like a cancer 
with a boil that someone is trying to lance out.  I felt and still feel like 
a failure. . . .  The counseling helped for a while but after that it 
reinforced the self-loathing and internalized homophobia. . . .  It 
increased my self-loathing greatly.”1 
 
“These practices have no basis in science or medicine and they will 
now be relegated to the dustbin of quackery . . . .”2 
                                                          
 1. Ariel Shidlo & Michael Schroeder, Changing Sexual Orientation:  A Consumers’ 
Report, 33 PROF’L PSYCHOL.:  RES. & PRAC. 249, 254 (2002) (alterations in original) 
(quoting one client who had undergone conversion therapy). 
 2. See Wyatt Buchanan, State Bans Gay-Repair Therapy for Minors, S.F. GATE, Sept. 
29, 2012, http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/State-bans-gay-repair-therapy-for-
minors-3906032.php (quoting California Governor Jerry Brown’s statement to the 
San Francisco Chronicle on signing Senate Bill 1172 banning conversion therapy). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Conversion therapy, a type of sexual orientation change therapy,3 
refers to talk therapy directed at changing the sexual orientation of 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or queer (LGBTQ) clients to a 
heterosexual orientation.  A procedure advocated for largely by 
conservative religious branches,4 scientific evidence demonstrates it 
to be harmful as well as ineffective at changing an individual’s sexual 
orientation.5  These concerns prompted California to enact Senate 
Bill 1172 (“SB 1172”),6 making it unprofessional conduct for mental 
health providers to try to change the sexual orientation of LGBTQ 
youth.7  This statute was immediately challenged in two separate suits 
on grounds that it restricted providers’ freedom of speech.8  Both 
cases were appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit after judges in the same district court issued conflicting 
opinions:  a preliminary injunction against SB 1172 was issued in 
Welch v. Brown,9 but not in Pickup v. Brown,10 decided a day later. 
The different outcomes in the district court cases resulted 
primarily from whether SB 1172 was considered a content-based 
restriction on health care providers’ speech requiring strict scrutiny, 
as in Welch,11 or as a restriction on professional conduct subject to 
rational basis review, as in Pickup.12  The Ninth Circuit, in a 
consolidated appeal, held that SB 1172 regulated professional 
conduct and not speech and was therefore only subject to rational 
                                                          
 3. See Karolyn Ann Hicks, Comment, “Reparative” Therapy:  Whether Parental 
Attempts To Change a Child’s Sexual Orientation Can Legally Constitute Child Abuse, 49 AM. 
U. L. REV. 506, 515 (1999) (discussing other approaches to changing sexual 
orientation, such as electrical shock therapy, chemical aversive therapy, and 
hormone therapy). 
 4. See Buchanan, supra note 2 (stating that proponents of the controversial 
therapy are often religious, prompting gay rights activists to refer to the therapy as an 
attempt to “pray away the gay”). 
 5. See infra Part I.D. 
 6. 2012 Cal. Stat. ch. 835 (codified at CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 865 (West 2013)). 
 7. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 865.2. The statute only addressed sexual 
orientation change efforts targeted at minors in order to protect this vulnerable 
group from this dangerous therapy.  Id. § 865.1.   
 8. Complaint, Pickup v. Brown, No. 2:12-CV-02497-KJM-EFB, 2012 WL 6021465, 
(E.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2012) (No. 2:12-CV-02497), 2012 WL 5981507; Complaint for 
Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, Welch v. Brown, 907 F. Supp. 2d 1102, (E.D. Cal. 
2012) (No. CIV. 212-2484), 2012 WL 4762008.  
 9. Welch v. Brown, 907 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1122 (E.D. Cal. 2012), rev’d sub nom. 
Pickup v. Brown, 728 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 10. Pickup v. Brown, No. 2:12-CV-02497-KJM-EFB, 2012 WL 6021465 (E.D. Cal. 
Dec. 4, 2012), aff’d, 728 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 11. Welch, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 1109, 1111. 
 12. Pickup, 2012 WL 6021465, at *9. 
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basis review.13  In part because this distinction between conduct and 
speech is often dispositive, this Comment advocates for a new 
approach to First Amendment review of laws affecting health care 
providers’ speech.  It argues that the First Amendment does not bar 
states from protecting their citizens from quackery—health care 
practices that lack scientific support.14  By applying a similar 
approach to what the Supreme Court uses to justify a lesser level of 
First Amendment protection for commercial speech, this Comment 
demonstrates that courts can weed out quackery while protecting 
legitimate health care speech.  By first determining whether the 
restricted speech is analogous to truthful and non-misleading 
commercial speech before applying strict scrutiny, courts will be able to 
use this “single-prong” approach to protect freedom of speech while also 
balancing the states’ interest in preventing harm to citizens. 
Part I explains the states’ role in regulating health care and 
explores the current approach to First Amendment protection of 
speech.  This exploration focuses on health care providers and the 
commercial speech doctrine.  This part also introduces conversion 
therapy and the California statute, SB 1172. 
Part II demonstrates that under the current approach, the 
California statute is likely to be ruled unconstitutional if considered a 
restriction on speech—a prototypical example of the flaws that exist 
with the current approach.  Thereafter, it fashions an approach that 
both protects freedom of speech and patients by applying to the 
health care field the reasoning and concepts the Supreme Court has 
used in connection to commercial speech.  Applying the first prong 
of the test articulated in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public 
Service Commission of New York,15—determining whether the restricted 
speech is truthful and non-misleading—and then applying strict 
scrutiny, will enable courts to weed out quackery.  Subsequently, this 
Part argues that SB 1172 would be a constitutional restriction on speech 
under this proposed single-prong approach.  Finally, this Comment 
concludes that the proposed single-prong approach provides sufficient 
protection for this special category of speech without trampling the 
states’ interest in protecting their citizens from harm. 
                                                          
 13. Pickup, 728 F.3d at 1056.  The decision ultimately reversed the District Court 
in Welch v. Brown but upheld Pickup v. Brown. 
 14. For a larger discussion of the definition of quackery, see Stephen Barrett, 
Quackery:  How Should It Be Defined?, QUACKWATCH, http://www.quackwatch.org/01 
QuackeryRelatedTopics/quackdef.html (last updated Jan. 17, 2009). 
 15. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
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I. BACKGROUND 
While much of health care is regulated through the federal 
government’s commerce and spending powers,16 this Comment 
focuses on state-level regulations of health care providers.  This Part 
explains the role of states in the regulation of health care to 
protect individuals from harm, as well as the role of the First 
Amendment in commercial speech and in the health care setting.  
Finally, this Part discusses conversion therapy, California’s attempt 
at banning sexual orientation change therapies through SB 1172, 
and the related legal challenges. 
A. States Regulate Health Care Under Their Police Powers 
The states’ police powers provide the authority to enact and 
enforce measures to protect the health, safety, and well-being of their 
citizens.17  States have a long history of using this power to regulate 
medicine in order to protect the public.18  States have used this police 
power to regulate professions, including health care, predominately 
through licensure.19  In Watson v. Maryland,20 decided in 1910, the 
Supreme Court recognized the states’ interest in regulating health 
care.21  In affirming a conviction for practicing medicine without a 
license, the Court noted that regulating a profession for the 
protection of the public health was a valid exercise of state police 
powers.22  States can require training and set specific educational 
standards as conditions for licensure.23  This control over the 
                                                          
 16. See generally Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. 
Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 703–06 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (detailing the history of drug 
regulation in the United States, culminating in the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act 
of 1938 and subsequent amendments).  Only when “interstate commerce began 
its great expansion after the Civil War did the need for Federal rule-making 
become widely realized.”  Id. at 704; see also Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 
250–51 (2006) (discussing the federal regulation of medications under the 
Controlled Substances Act). 
 17. 39 AM. JUR. 2D Health § 1 (2012); see also 39A C.J.S. Health and Environment § 1 
(2012) (“[T]here is no public policy more important than the protection of citizens 
from practices which may injure their health.”). 
 18. See, e.g., Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S. 173, 176 (1910) (recognizing the well-
settled principle that states historically have had the power to regulate the health 
profession); Pearson v. McCaffrey, 139 F. Supp. 2d 113, 121 (D.D.C. 2001) 
(discussing states’ authority to regulate speech within the doctor-patient relationship 
(citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603 n.30 (1977))). 
 19. 53 C.J.S. Licenses § 8 (2012). 
 20. 218 U.S. 173. 
 21. See id. at 176 (noting that “[d]ealing . . . with the lives and health of the 
people” justifies states’ involvement in regulating the health profession).  
 22. Id. at 178. 
 23. 53 C.J.S. Licenses, supra note 19, § 8. 
FULTZ.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE) 1/9/2014  3:46 PM 
572 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:567 
educational and training requirements determines who can enter a 
profession and allows the state to prevent harm to its citizens.24 
In addition to controlling who can enter a profession, states’ police 
powers allow restrictions on licensed professionals when necessary to 
protect the welfare and safety of society.25  In 1935, in Semler v. Oregon 
State Board of Dental Examiners,26 the Supreme Court upheld state 
sanctions against a dentist for advertising.27  The Court noted that 
states’ authority to regulate the medical profession through licensing 
and licensing boards was “not open to dispute.”28  The Court further 
held that ensuring the competence of individual dentists as well as 
protecting the public from being “prey[ed] upon . . . through 
alluring promises of physical relief” was within the state’s authority.29  
Ten years later, Justice Jackson, in his concurrence to the Court’s 
reversal of a contempt conviction in Thomas v. Collins,30 articulated 
that state licensing authority allowed the state to protect citizens from 
incompetent professionals.31 
State licensing authority covers a wide range of health care 
professions.  For example, in Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 
Inc.,32 the Court upheld restrictions on opticians as within the state’s 
power, despite opticians’ tangential impact on health.33  Likewise, in 
National Ass’n for Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. California Board of 
Psychology,34 the Ninth Circuit upheld a challenge to the licensing of 
psychoanalysts who only practiced talk therapy—finding licensing 
within the state’s authority.35  The court also held that state licensure 
                                                          
 24. See id. § 1 (explaining that engaging in an activity without a license would 
be illegal). 
 25. See, e.g., Albany Surgical, P.C. v. Dep’t of Cmty. Health, 572 S.E.2d 638, 642–
43 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (noting the test for reasonableness of restrictions is the 
impact upon the professional and the public). 
 26. 294 U.S. 608 (1935). 
 27. Id. at 609, 611, 613.  At this time, the Court did not recognize First 
Amendment protection of advertising; First Amendment protection of advertising 
did not develop until 1976.  See infra Part I.C. 
 28. Semler, 294 U.S. at 611. 
 29. Id. at 612; see also Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S. 173, 176 (1910) (stating that 
it is well established that states’ police powers extend to the regulation of certain 
professions, “particularly those which closely concern the public health”); cf. Linder 
v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 18 (1925) (recognizing that control of the medical 
practice is a state power rather than a federal power). 
 30. 323 U.S. 516 (1945). 
 31. Id. at 545 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 32. 348 U.S. 483 (1955). 
 33. See id. at 490 (explaining that because eyeglass frames are used in 
conjunction with lenses which pertain to vision, selling such frames enters the “field 
of health”). 
 34. 228 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 35. Id. at 1054. 
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did not violate the psychoanalysts’ First Amendment rights.36  The 
court noted that the licensing laws did not restrict the content of 
therapy, or the therapeutic modalities used, and were therefore 
content neutral.37 
In addition to licensure provisions, the state also has responsibility 
for determining professional standards.38  These standards are usually 
set through the state licensing authority within each profession.39  For 
health care, those standards must be “grounded in the methods and 
procedures of science.”40  When a professional violates the standards, 
the licensing authority can impose sanctions such as suspending or 
revoking a license in order to protect public health and safety.41  
Courts have upheld the compelling interest in protecting the quality 
of health care.42  Like the licensing provisions that can prevent an 
incompetent provider from entering the profession, sanctioning 
providers who have violated professional standards may prevent 
future harm.  However, the sanctions usually come after at least some 
harm has already occurred to a client or patient.43 
Aside from regulating professionals through licensure and 
professional standards, courts have recognized the role of states in 
directly regulating medical practice.  For example, in Oregon v. 
Ashcroft,44 the Ninth Circuit upheld an injunction preventing the U.S. 
Attorney General from enforcing an interpretative federal rule 
stating that physicians who assisted suicides consistent with state law 
                                                          
 36. See id. (noting that speech used to treat patients received some First 
Amendment protection but was not “immune from regulation”). 
 37. See id. at 1055–56 (explaining additionally that no speech is being suppressed 
because of its message).  
 38. See, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 460 (1978) (noting the 
state’s strong interests in regulating the conduct of lawyers (citing Williamson v. Lee 
Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955))). 
 39. See, e.g., Semler v. Or. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 294 U.S. 608, 611 (1935) 
(reciting the well-accepted proposition that a state may regulate certain professional 
requirements, such as requiring licenses or establishing an administrative board). 
 40. Armstrong v. State, 989 P.2d 364, 380 (Mont. 1999) (explaining that the 
legislature has “no interest, much less a compelling one” in prohibiting a medical 
practice the medical authority has deemed without risk). 
 41. 53 C.J.S. Licenses, supra note 19, § 82 (discussing a states’ discretionary power 
to impose sanctions through licensing authorities). 
 42. See, e.g., Caddy v. State, 764 So. 2d 625, 629 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) 
(declaring the State’s compelling interest in “protecting the mental health of its 
citizens” and “protecting the integrity of the medical profession”). 
 43. Another approach to protecting the quality of health care that is only 
applicable after the harm has occurred is tort law.  See ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, 
EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM:  A FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE 
MODERN STATE 53 (2012) (stating that malpractice is one “vehicle for law to 
incorporate and enforce pertinent disciplinary standards”). 
 44. 368 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2004), aff’d sub nom. Gonzalez v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 
243 (2006). 
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were in violation of the Controlled Substance Act.45  The court 
explained that physician-assisted suicide is a medical practice that is 
appropriately regulated by the state.46  The court stated that the 
principle of federalism requires state, not federal, direct control over 
medicine.47  In affirming the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court in 
Gonzales v. Oregon48 reiterated that the principle of federalism gives 
states “great latitude” in protecting their citizens.49  Both federalism 
and the police powers of licensure and professional standards 
provide states with multiple tools to regulate health care.  
B. Health Care Providers’ Speech Is Protected by the First Amendment 
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits the 
government from restricting the freedom of speech.50  However, the 
Supreme Court has not interpreted this as a blanket prohibition on 
speech restrictions and treats various types of speech differently.  For 
example, truthful speech proposing a commercial transaction 
receives an intermediate level of scrutiny.51  On the other hand, strict 
scrutiny is applied when examining the constitutionality of a 
restriction on an individual’s speech, often considered potential 
political speech, requiring that any restriction be narrowly tailored 
and further a compelling government interest.52  This section 
discusses the role of the First Amendment in protecting health care 
providers’ speech.  Courts treat speech that occurs between a health 
care provider and a patient in the course of providing professional 
services like the speech of individuals. 
In relation to individuals’ speech, government restrictions based 
on content or viewpoint are rarely constitutional; it is well established 
                                                          
 45. Id. at 1120 (referring to the Controlled Substances Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 801–904 (2000)). 
 46. See id. at 1126 (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), a case 
in which the Supreme Court refused to find a liberty interest protected by the Due 
Process Clause in committing suicide and, as such, a state ban on assisted suicide was 
upheld as being rationally related to a government interest). 
 47. See id. at 1124 (“The Supreme Court has made the constitutional principle 
clear . . . .”). 
 48. 546 U.S. 243 (2006). 
 49. Id. at 270 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The Court also noted 
Congressional affirmation of the principle that regulation of medical practice is 
under state authority when it drafted the Controlled Substances Act’s preemption 
provision.  Id. at 270–71. 
 50. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 51. See infra Part I.C. 
 52. See, e.g., Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 
U.S. 530, 532, 540 (1980) (applying strict scrutiny to a regulation that forbids 
privately owned public utility companies from including political inserts in its 
customers’ bills). 
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that the government cannot restrict speech because of its message.53  
The Supreme Court has even described the prohibition on 
government restriction of speech because of its content as 
“axiomatic.”54  For example, in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of 
University of Virginia,55 the Supreme Court examined the 
constitutionality of the university’s refusal to reimburse a student 
organization for publication of a newspaper because of the 
newspaper’s religious nature.56  The Court found this refusal 
constituted a viewpoint-based restriction because the university 
reimbursed publications that discussed religion as a subject but not 
publications that were religiously oriented.57  The Court held that the 
university’s withholding of funds to the student organization violated 
the students’ freedom of speech.58  It also noted that restrictions that 
target a particular viewpoint are “presumed to be unconstitutional.”59  
In general, the government cannot restrict speech based on the 
opinion or perspective of the speaker.60  On the other hand, 
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on speech are 
permissible,61 provided they are narrowly tailored to serve a legitimate 
state interest.62 
Despite this general rule, the government may have some leeway in 
regulating speech that is “incidental to the conduct of [a] 
profession.”63  Justice White defined a professional as someone who 
serves an individual client by exercising judgment on that client’s 
behalf.64  The individual relationship between the professional and 
that individual client is what permits regulation of professional 
speech.65  Without this relationship, the speech could not be 
                                                          
 53. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972) (distinguishing 
between regulations that restrict activity because of its message and regulations that 
limit the “time, place and manner”). 
 54. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995) 
(citing Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972)). 
 55. 515 U.S. 819. 
 56. Id. at 822–23. 
 57. Id. at 831. 
 58. Id. at 837. 
 59. Id. at 828 (citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641–43 (1994)). 
 60. See id. at 829 (finding that settled principles of law “provide [a] framework 
forbidding the State to exercise viewpoint discrimination”). 
 61. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972) (giving the example 
that the government could prevent two parades from marching at the same time). 
 62. See id. at 116–17 (“The crucial question is whether the manner of 
expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place 
at a particular time.”). 
 63. Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 232 (1985) (White, J., concurring in judgment). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
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regulated as “incidental” to the professional conduct and would be 
subject to full First Amendment protection.66 
Despite this potential leeway, most attempts at restricting health 
care providers’ speech have not survived constitutional challenge.  In 
1945, Justice Jackson’s concurrence first discussed the protection of 
health care providers’ speech in Thomas v. Collins,67 where the Court 
overturned a contempt conviction.68  Justice Jackson noted that while 
states could use their licensing authority to limit who could enter a 
profession, they could not limit what those people said in their 
professional capacity.69  Nevertheless, legislatures have repeatedly 
tried to regulate health care provider speech on certain controversial 
topics where there is legitimate scientific debate, including the 
medicinal use of marijuana, firearms, and abortion.70  While courts 
have often upheld restrictions on health care provider speech related 
to abortion, they have not taken the same approach with speech on 
the other topics. 
1. Medical marijuana 
In 1996, in response to the legalization of medical marijuana in 
Arizona and California, the federal government issued a policy 
stating that physicians “recommending or prescribing” medical 
marijuana would lose their authority to prescribe controlled 
substances.71  This policy was challenged on First Amendment 
grounds in federal courts in both the District of Columbia and 
California, and concluded with different outcomes. 
In Pearson v. McCaffrey,72 the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia upheld the federal policy as not infringing on physicians’ 
First Amendment right to freedom of speech.73  The court ruled that 
this was not a content-based speech restriction because physicians 
were free to discuss the benefits of medical marijuana with patients.74  
                                                          
 66. Id.; see also infra notes 240–241 and accompanying text. 
 67. 323 U.S. 516 (1945). 
 68. See id. at 540 (determining that the lower court’s contempt order was 
inappropriate because the Texas statute that the petitioner had allegedly violated was 
applied in a way that impermissibly restrained free speech and assembly). 
 69. Id. at 544 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“[B]ut I do not think it could make it a 
crime publicly or privately to speak urging persons to follow or reject any school of 
medical thought.”). 
 70. The importance of this fact will be addressed in Part II.B infra. 
 71. BARRY R. MCCAFFREY, OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, THE 
ADMINISTRATION’S RESPONSE TO THE PASSAGE OF CALIFORNIA PROPOSITION 215 AND ARIZONA 
PROPOSITION 200 (1996), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/txtfiles/215rel.txt. 
 72. 139 F. Supp. 2d 113 (D.D.C. 2001). 
 73. Id. at 116, 119–22, 125. 
 74. See id. at 120 (relying on the government’s position during oral arguments 
that federal law did not prohibit discussing medical marijuana). 
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The court found the act of recommending was conduct akin to 
prescribing because, under the law of some states, a physician’s 
recommendation could be used to purchase medical marijuana.75  
The court further justified the distinction between speech discussing 
the benefits of marijuana use and the act of recommending 
marijuana by pointing to the long history of state regulation of 
medicine,76 the state’s authority to reasonably regulate speech that is 
part of the practice of medicine,77 and the lack of First Amendment 
protection for speech used to commit a crime.78 
In Conant v. McCaffrey,79 the district court issued a permanent 
injunction against the federal government’s policy80 reasoning that a 
physician’s recommendation to use marijuana could potentially result 
in the patient petitioning the government to legalize marijuana.81  
The court also noted the importance of protecting patients’ ability to 
participate in the “marketplace of ideas,” including discussions about 
the regulation of marijuana.82  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed 
in Conant v. Walters.83  In addition to reiterating the First Amendment 
analysis, the appellate court also stressed the importance of open 
communication between patients and physicians.84  Rather than using 
a history of state regulation to justify restrictions, the Ninth Circuit 
instead stated “professional speech may be entitled to ‘the strongest 
protection our Constitution has to offer.’”85 
2. Firearms 
In 2011, a group of physicians challenged Florida’s Firearm 
Owners’ Privacy Act, a law restricting physicians’ ability to inquire 
                                                          
 75. Id. at 120–21. 
 76. Id. at 121 (citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603 n.30 (1977)). 
 77. Id. (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) 
(plurality opinion)).  
 78. See id. (summarizing cases that hold that the First Amendment is not a 
criminal defense).  Despite the state law authorizing use of medical marijuana, its use 
is still a federal crime under the Controlled Substances Act.  Id. 
 79. No. C 97-00139 WHA, 2000 WL 1281174 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2000), aff’d sub 
nom. Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 80. Id. at *16. 
 81. See id. at *14–15 (describing several doctor recommendations that could lead 
to a legitimate response including enrolling in an experimental trial or traveling to a 
country where marijuana use is legal). 
 82. See id. at *14 (explaining how restricting the capability of a doctor to 
communicate with a patient about medical marijuana prevented the patient from 
participating in the public discourse on the subject). 
 83. 309 F.3d 629, 639 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 84. See id. at 636 (referencing the doctor-patient privilege recognized in the 
Federal Rules of Evidence). 
 85. Id. at 637 (quoting Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 634 (1995)). 
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about ownership of firearms.86  The U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of Florida rejected the state’s argument that the law 
protected the Second Amendment rights of gun owners.87  Instead, 
the court’s decision focused on the law’s impact on the free speech 
rights of health care providers.88  In granting the preliminary 
injunction against enforcement of the relevant act, the court 
identified the value of not restricting speech within the doctor-
patient relationship.89  When later granting the permanent 
injunction, Judge Cooke again observed that the restriction was not a 
regulation of speech incidental to professional conduct but rather a 
restriction on truthful, non-misleading speech.90  Because the 
Supreme Court had applied strict scrutiny in Sorrell v. IMS Health, 
Inc.91 to evaluate a content-based restriction on pharmaceutical 
companies’ commercial speech, the district court had applied strict 
scrutiny to the Firearm Owners’ Privacy Act at the preliminary 
injunction stage.92  Judge Cooke went on to state that the level of 
scrutiny to apply to professional speech is “an unsettled question of 
law.”93  However, in that case the level of scrutiny did not matter 
because the Florida law failed under either level of scrutiny because 
the state had not demonstrated a problem that needed to be 
addressed and because the statute did not address the type of 
problem postulated.94 
3. Abortion 
A larger area of case law exploring the First Amendment 
protection of health care providers’ speech is in regard to abortion.  
                                                          
 86. Wollschlaeger v. Farmer, 814 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1373 (S.D. Fla. 2011). 
 87. Id. at 1374 (holding that the Second Amendment right to “keep arms” was 
categorically distinct from the rights at issue in Florida’s Firearm Owner’s Privacy Act 
(citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 582–83 (2008))). 
 88. See id. at 1374, 1377–83 (applying strict scrutiny to determine plaintiffs’ 
likelihood of success on the merits). 
 89. See id. at 1374 (emphasizing the importance of “the free flow of truthful, non-
misleading information within the doctor-patient relationship” (citing Sorrell v. IMS 
Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2664 (2011); Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 
(1980); Conant, 309 F.3d at 636)). 
 90. Wollschlaeger v. Farmer, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1262 (S.D. Fla. 2012).  
Regulations of speech incidental to professional conduct “govern the access or 
practice of a profession; they do not burden or prohibit truthful, non-misleading 
speech within the scope of the profession.”  Id. 
 91. 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011); see also infra notes 167–175 and accompanying text 
(discussing Sorrell). 
 92. Wollschlaeger, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 1262. 
 93. See id. at 1262–63 (noting that in Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 
1074 (1991), the Supreme Court held that a lawyer’s speech related to pending cases 
could receive less protection than freedom of speech by the press). 
 94. Id. at 1264–67. 
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Here the Supreme Court has been more deferential to state restrictions, 
sometimes by reframing the constitutional question so as to avoid 
triggering review under the First Amendment, and sometimes by simply 
dismissing the argument without significant analysis.95 
In Rust v. Sullivan,96 the Supreme Court upheld federal restrictions 
on family-planning funds awarded under Title X of the Public Health 
Service Act.97  By casting the case as simply a restriction on the 
allowable scope of a government-funded project, the Court avoided 
addressing whether the restriction violated the physicians’ freedom of 
speech.98  Under the statute, health care providers employed under 
the Title X program remained free to advocate for, recommend, or 
provide abortion services outside the Title X project.99  However, the 
Court avoided examining whether the government had committed 
viewpoint discrimination by funding one viewpoint but not another.100 
Further, the Court has been reluctant to address First Amendment 
implications regarding the doctor-patient relationship.  The Court 
stated that the Title X program did not infringe upon the doctor-
patient relationship enough to require addressing whether that 
relationship enjoyed First Amendment protection when funded by 
the government.101  The Court relied partly on the argument that the 
doctor-patient relationship within the Title X program was not 
“sufficiently all encompassing” as to replace the traditional doctor-
patient relationship.102  In his dissent, Justice Blackmun objected to 
imposing restrictions on speech within the doctor-patient 
relationship, even when the relationship was limited to 
family-planning services.103  In addition to citing the physicians’ 
ethical responsibility to offer all appropriate therapeutic options,104 
he highlighted the “unique relationship of trust” that occurs between 
                                                          
 95. See infra notes 96–111 and accompanying text (outlining cases that have 
taken these approaches). 
 96. 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
 97. Id. at 203 (referring to Pub. L. 91-572, § 6(c), 84 Stat. 1506 (1970) (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300 to 300a-6 (2012))). 
 98. See id. at 194 (“This is not a case of the Government ‘suppressing a dangerous 
idea,’ but of a prohibition on a project grantee or its employees from engaging in 
activities outside of the project’s scope.”). 
 99. See id. at 198–99 (differentiating between the employees’ time working on the 
project, and their time as private citizens). 
 100. See id. at 194 (explaining that this might invalidate multiple 
governmental programs). 
 101. Id. at 200. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 213, 218–19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 104. See id. at 214 (referencing two medical societies and a presidential 
commission). 
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patients and doctors.105  He went on to remind the majority of its 
previous warnings that speech restrictions on the practice of 
medicine “cannot endure.”106 
The Supreme Court has also upheld compelled speech related to 
abortion.  In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,107 
the Court upheld a provision of a law that required physicians to 
provide informed consent as specified by the State.108  The Court 
dismissed the physicians’ First Amendment claim against 
compelled speech because the impacted speech was “part of the 
practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and 
regulation by the State.”109 
The same reasoning was later used by the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Eighth Circuit to uphold a South Dakota abortion statute 
requiring physicians to disclose an increased statistical risk of suicide 
and suicide attempts in women who undergo abortions.110  The 
Eighth Circuit noted that the First Amendment would protect 
individuals from compelled speech, but would not protect physicians 
compelled to give “truthful, nonmisleading information,” even if that 
information might make a patient choose to forego an abortion.111  
The court described this requirement as a valid use of regulatory 
authority and not compelled speaking of the “State’s ideological 
message.”112  The only way to show the speech violated the First 
Amendment would be if it was untruthful, misleading, or irrelevant to 
deciding whether to have an abortion.113 
                                                          
 105. See id. at 218 (noting that patients put “complete confidence, and often their 
very lives, in the hands of” physicians). 
 106. Id. (citing Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 
67 n.8 (1976)). 
 107. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 108. See id. at 881–87 (plurality opinion) (analyzing the informed consent 
requirement and determining it was not an undue burden on constitutionally 
protected abortion rights). 
 109. Id. at 884.  Other courts have noted the lack of emphasis the Supreme Court 
placed on this argument.  See, e.g., Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. 
Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 575 (5th Cir. 2012) (“The three sentences with which the Court 
disposed of the First Amendment claims are, if anything, the antithesis of strict 
scrutiny.”); Summit Med. Ctr. of Ala., Inc. v. Riley, 274 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1269 (M.D. 
Ala. 2003) (mentioning the “brief fashion” with which the Supreme Court dismissed 
the First Amendment claim). 
 110. See Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889, 893 (8th 
Cir. 2012) (en banc) (finding that, as established by Casey, the state’s “suicide 
advisory” rule is subject to “reasonable licensing and regulation by the state”). 
 111. Id.  Interestingly, the court requires more than eleven pages to explain why 
the disclosure is truthful and non-misleading.  Id. at 893–905. 
 112. Id. at 893. 
 113. Id. 
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Governmental efforts to restrict health care providers’ speech have 
consistently failed strict scrutiny.114  However, for speech related to 
abortion, courts have avoided analyzing the health care providers’ 
speech under the First Amendment or found other ways to uphold 
statutes compelling or restricting speech. 
C. The Commercial Speech Doctrine 
Unlike individuals’ speech, commercial speech has only received 
First Amendment protection for approximately forty years.115  
Furthermore, it receives less First Amendment protection than non-
commercial speech.116  In health care, the commercial speech 
doctrine has been applied primarily in the area of advertising.117 
The first case to provide First Amendment protection to 
commercial speech was the 1976 case Virginia State Board of Pharmacy 
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.118  There, the Court 
examined the constitutionality of a Virginia statute that designated 
advertising prescription drug prices as unprofessional conduct.119  
The Court rejected Virginia’s claim that advertising drug prices 
would lead to cost-cutting measures and endanger customers, 
deeming the claim “highly paternalistic.”120  The Court went on to 
note that the First Amendment prevents the government from 
choosing between the “dangers of suppressing information, and the 
dangers of its misuse if it is freely available.”121  In saying this, the 
Court established that the First Amendment protects commercial 
speech because customers can only make the best decisions when 
they are well informed.122  At the same time, the Court noted that 
                                                          
 114. Except for the medical marijuana cases and Rust v. Sullivan, which involved 
federal laws, these cases were challenges to states’ restrictions on speech.  The 
Supreme Court has not applied the First Amendment differently when restrictions 
are based on states’ police powers as compared to federal law. 
 115. The Court’s earlier approach to commercial speech failed to provide any 
First Amendment protection whatsoever.  See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 
54–55 (1942) (“We are equally clear that the Constitution imposes no such restraint 
on government as respects purely commercial advertising.”). 
 116. See infra notes 125–135 and accompanying text (detailing the current First 
Amendment commercial speech doctrine). 
 117. In fact, the most recent pronouncement from the Court in the realm of 
commercial speech came in the health care field, in which the Court struck down a 
Vermont statute restricting the sale, disclosure and use of pharmacy records for 
marketing purposes.  Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). 
 118. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
 119. Id. at 752–54. 
 120. Id. at 770. 
 121. Id. 
 122. See id. (explaining that by providing open access to non-harmful 
information, people will then have the necessary information they need to 
pursue their own best interests). 
FULTZ.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE) 1/9/2014  3:46 PM 
582 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:567 
commercial speech could be regulated through time, place, and 
manner restrictions and likely could be restricted if the speech was 
deceptive.123  In his concurrence, Justice Stewart elaborated that there 
is less tolerance for inaccurate information in commercial speech 
because, unlike the press which may need to rely on multiple sources 
to verify a statement, a commercial advertiser is well-positioned to 
provide accurate information.124 
The current approach to First Amendment protection of 
commercial speech was articulated in Central Hudson Gas & Electric 
Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York,125 where the Court 
overturned a New York Public Service Commission’s regulation that 
prohibited advertising by an electrical utility.126  The Court justified 
subjecting restrictions of commercial speech to a lower level of 
constitutional scrutiny because of the “common-sense distinction” 
between commercial and non-commercial speech and because 
commercial transactions are traditionally regulated by the 
government.127  In the commercial arena, the First Amendment 
balances the listener’s need for information against the government’s 
interest in regulating the commercial speaker.128 
In Central Hudson, the Court devised a four-prong analysis for 
restrictions on commercial speech.  First, to receive protection, the 
commercial speech must not be false, misleading, or propose an 
illegal transaction.129  Misleading commercial speech can be banned 
because it is “more likely to deceive the public than to inform it.”130  
The second prong requires the government to demonstrate a 
substantial interest in regulating the commercial speech.131  To 
survive the third prong, the regulation must directly advance the 
government’s interest.132  Finally, the restriction must be no more 
extensive than necessary to serve the government’s interest.133  When 
                                                          
 123. Id. at 771. 
 124. Id. at 777 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 125. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
 126. Id. at 570–72. 
 127. Id. at 562–63 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 128. See id. at 563 (stating that the conveyance of information through advertising 
is why the commercial message receives First Amendment protection); see also POST, 
supra note 43, at 42–43 (2012) (explaining that the First Amendment usually protects 
the voice of the speaker, while lower levels of protection for commercial speech are 
justified by the Court’s focus on protecting the listener). 
 129. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. 
 130. Id. at 563.  The Court notes that First Amendment protection of commercial 
speech arises out of the “informational function of advertising.”  Id. (citing First Nat’l 
Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978)). 
 131. Id. at 566. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
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commercial speech is false or misleading, it receives no First 
Amendment protection and is examined under rational basis 
review.134  If, on the other hand, it is not false or misleading, the 
speech receives protection under intermediate scrutiny through 
application of the second, third, and fourth prongs.135 
The Supreme Court has continued to rely on the First Amendment 
to protect consumers in commercial speech cases.  In City of 
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.,136 the Court overturned a city 
ordinance banning commercial news racks except those containing 
newspapers.137  The majority held that because the ordinance only 
banned news racks with a specific type of content, it was a content-
based restriction.138  Additionally, the content of the news racks had 
no differential impact on safety,139 and it was not a reasonable time, 
place, or manner restriction because the ordinance differentiated 
between news racks based solely on content.140 
In his Discovery Network concurrence, Justice Blackmun noted that 
he had concurred in Central Hudson only because the commercial 
speech restrictions had targeted the substantial government interest 
of protecting consumers.141  He did not think commercial speech was 
inherently less deserving of protection under the First Amendment.142  
He felt that the source of protection for commercial speech was the 
listener’s interest, which allowed for only “certain specific” types of 
regulations.143  Justice Blackmun was concerned because Central 
Hudson left open the possibility that a narrowly drawn restriction on 
truthful speech could survive the Court’s four-prong test.144  He 
chided the majority for not using this case to address that loophole by 
                                                          
 134. See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982) (explaining that misleading 
commercial speech can be subject to “appropriate restrictions” or a complete ban); 
see also, 1-800-411-Pain Referral Serv., LLC v. Tollefson, 915 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1051, 
1055 (D. Minn. 2012) (finding the statutory provision at issue was prohibiting 
commercial speech that was “inherently misleading” and therefore the statute did 
not violate the First Amendment). 
 135. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 433–34 (1993) 
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (describing the “lesser protection” that courts should 
provide to commercial speech that is not false or misleading). 
 136. 507 U.S. 410. 
 137. Id. at 431. 
 138. Id. at 429. 
 139. See id. at 430 (noting that there was no concern about “secondary effects”). 
 140. Id. 
 141. See id. at 434–35 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (arguing that the Central Hudson 
majority opinion was not consistent with the Court’s prior cases). 
 142. Id. at 433. 
 143. Id. at 433–34. 
 144. See id. at 435 (noting that the majority opinion in Central Hudson specifically 
stated that a restriction in advertising encouraging electricity use might survive 
scrutiny if sufficiently narrowly-tailored). 
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unequivocally stating that truthful and non-misleading commercial 
speech should receive full protection under the First Amendment.145 
In 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,146 the Court reiterated the 
distinction between regulations that address false or misleading 
commercial speech and regulations restricting truthful commercial 
speech when it overturned Rhode Island’s ban on advertising the 
prices of alcoholic beverages.147  The Court reaffirmed that the state’s 
ability to regulate commercial speech arises out of the authority to 
regulate commercial transactions and the state’s interest in 
protecting consumers from harm.148  The Court applied 
intermediate scrutiny, rather than rational basis review, when it 
analyzed these bans on truthful commercial speech because the 
restrictions were less likely to protect consumers and more likely 
used to support a governmental policy that could be implemented 
without banning speech.149 
1. Commercial speech of professionals 
The commercial speech doctrine has primarily been applied to the 
speech of health care providers and other professionals in the area of 
advertising and soliciting business.150  In fact, as discussed above, the 
first case to recognize First Amendment protection of commercial 
speech, Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, arose from restrictions on 
pharmacists advertising brand name drug prices.151 
A year later, in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,152 the Supreme Court 
overturned a ban on legal services advertising.153  The Court rejected 
the state’s arguments that advertising prices would have an effect on 
professionalism154 or quality of services.155  The Court did not reject 
the state’s theory that harm from deceptive advertising might not be 
sufficiently restrained by after-the-fact consumer actions because 
those consumers might not have the requisite legal expertise to judge 
                                                          
 145. See id. at 436 (finding intermediate scrutiny only appropriate for speech 
restrictions aimed at protecting consumers from “misleading or coercive speech, or a 
regulation related to the time, place, or manner of commercial speech”). 
 146. 517 U.S. 484 (1996). 
 147. Id. at 501, 516. 
 148. Id. at 499, 502. 
 149. Id. at 502–03 (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n 
of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 n.9 (1980)). 
 150. In general, the Supreme Court treats the speech of professionals including 
doctors, lawyers, financial advisors and pharmacists the same.  Therefore, this section 
will use cases from a variety of professions. 
 151. See supra notes 118–124 and accompanying text for a full discussion of this case. 
 152. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
 153. Id. at 384. 
 154. Id. at 368. 
 155. Id. at 378. 
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the quality of services.156  However, the Court did reject the argument 
that the burden of preventing this harm through oversight of 
advertising would be so burdensome on the state as to justify a 
complete ban.157  Again the Court noted that restrictions on false or 
misleading advertising, illegal transactions advertising, and time, 
place, and manner advertising restrictions were permissible.158 
The following year, the Court upheld disciplinary actions against a 
lawyer for soliciting business through in-person contact, holding that 
the punishment did not violate the First Amendment.  In Ohralik v. 
Ohio State Bar Ass’n,159 the Court distinguished the solicitation at issue 
from the advertising in Bates because solicitation of business was a 
“transaction in which speech is an essential but subordinate 
component.”160  The Court explained that states have the power to 
make conduct illegal, even when that conduct involves speech, 
without violating the First Amendment.161 
The Court returned to pharmacist advertising in Thompson v. 
Western States Medical Center,162 where it struck down provisions of the 
Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997163 that 
prohibited pharmacies from advertising details about compounding 
services.164  While the Court recognized the government’s interest in 
preserving the drug-approval process, it noted that there were several 
less–restrictive approaches available such as limiting the quantity of 
compounded drugs a pharmacy could sell.165  The Court’s opinion 
was particularly worried with Congress’s choice to restrict speech over 
other approaches, stating “[i]f the First Amendment means anything, 
it means that regulating speech must be a last—not first—resort.”166 
                                                          
 156. Id. at 379. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 383–84 (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer 
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771–72 (1976); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh 
Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 388 (1973)). 
 159. 436 U.S. 447 (1978). 
 160. Id. at 457. 
 161. See id. at 456 (providing examples that “illustrate[] that the State does not 
lose its power to regulate commercial activity deemed harmful to the public 
whenever speech is a component of that activity”). 
 162. 535 U.S. 357 (2002). 
 163. Pub. L. No 105-115, § 127(a), 111 Stat. 2296, 2328, invalidated by Thompson, 
535 U.S. 357. 
 164. Thompson, 535 U.S. at 360, 377.  Compounding allows a pharmacist to create 
a patient-tailored medication where one may not be commercially available because 
of allergies to a component of the commercially available drug or to alter the flavor 
to make a drug more palatable for children.  Id. at 360–61, 377. 
 165. See id. at 370–72 (discussing other potential regulations that would prevent 
pharmacists from becoming large-scale drug manufacturers). 
 166. Id. at 373. 
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In Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,167 the Supreme Court suggested for the 
first time that restrictions on commercial speech should be subject to 
heighted First Amendment scrutiny, rather than the intermediate 
level articulated in Central Hudson.168  Sorrell involved marketing 
speech of pharmaceutical companies.169  The Supreme Court 
affirmed a U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decision 
overturning a Vermont statute that restricted the sale and use of 
pharmacies’ prescribing records for marketing purposes.170  Because 
the statute only restricted the use of the records for pharmaceutical 
marketing, and not for purposes such as research, the Court held 
that it was a content-based speech restriction requiring heightened 
scrutiny.171  The Court acknowledged that content-based restrictions 
might be permissible under the commercial speech doctrine, but 
found that Vermont had not shown a neutral justification for the 
content-based restriction.172  Interestingly, the Court did not examine 
the Central Hudson factors.173  Justice Breyer, writing for the dissent, 
observed that the majority’s heightened scrutiny analysis was stricter 
than the approach taken in Central Hudson and that content-based 
restrictions of commercial speech had never received greater scrutiny 
than other restrictions on commercial speech.174  Justice Breyer 
concluded that the statute was constitutional under Central Hudson’s 
intermediate scrutiny test.175 
In United States v. Caronia,176 the Second Circuit returned to the 
four-prong test established in Central Hudson but suggested that 
content-based restrictions might be subject to heightened scrutiny.177  
Relying partly on Sorrell, a divided panel vacated a criminal conviction 
for conspiracy to introduce a misbranded drug into interstate 
commerce.178  The court found that Caronia was prosecuted for his 
speech promoting the off-label use of a drug.179  After establishing 
                                                          
 167. 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). 
 168. Id. at 2659. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 2659, 2672. 
 171. Id. at 2663–64. 
 172. Id. at 2672. 
 173. See id. at 2663–64 (deciding that the government regulation restricting 
speech was content-based, and therefore subject to heightened scrutiny); see also 
United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 164 (2d Cir. 2012) (indicating that the 
Supreme Court did not determine the level of heightened scrutiny (i.e., 
intermediate or strict) to apply in Sorrell). 
 174. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2677 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 175. Id. at 2679. 
 176. 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 177. Id. at 164. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 162. 
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that the prohibition on off-label promotion by pharmaceutical 
companies and their agents was a content-based restriction, the court 
applied heightened scrutiny.180  Unlike the Supreme Court in Sorrell, 
the Second Circuit explicitly applied the Central Hudson criteria and 
held that this speech restriction failed both the third and fourth 
prongs.181  The dissenting judge would have held that Caronia was 
not prosecuted for his speech, but even if he were, the restriction on 
speech would have been constitutional under Central Hudson.182 
In summary, while not initially recognizing protection for 
commercial speech under the First Amendment, the Supreme Court 
has acknowledged some level of commercial speech coverage for 
approximately forty years.183  The Court developed the current 
commercial speech doctrine more fully in Central Hudson.184  Under 
the four-prong test, government restrictions on false or misleading 
speech must only satisfy rational basis review, while restrictions on 
truthful speech are subjected to intermediate scrutiny.185  However, 
several recent cases suggest that content-based restrictions on 
commercial speech may be subject to even higher levels of scrutiny.186 
D. Conversion Therapy and SB 1172 
Until 1973, the American Psychiatric Association (APA) classified 
homosexuality as a mental disorder.187  Since the APA removed 
homosexuality from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM-III), mainstream mental health organizations’ and 
the general public’s views on homosexuality have changed.188  Despite 
                                                          
 180. Id. at 164–65. 
 181. Id. at 166–67. 
 182. Id. at 172, 181 (Livingston, J., dissenting). 
 183. See Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 
748, 770 (1976) (holding that commercial speech is protected by the First 
Amendment because customers can only make the best decision when well-
informed).  
 184. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 
557, 563–66 (1980) (expanding the commercial speech analysis by adopting a four-
factor test). 
 185. Id. at 566.  
 186. See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2664 (2011) (holding that 
the Vermont statute was a content-based speech restriction requiring heightened 
scrutiny); Caronia, 703 F.3d at 164–65  (applying heightened scrutiny after 
establishing that the prohibition on off-label promotion by pharmaceutical 
companies and their agents was a content-based restriction). 
 187. Laura A. Gans, Inverts, Perverts, and Converts:  Sexual Orientation Conversion 
Therapy and Liability, 8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 219, 221–22 (1999) (discussing how 
homosexuality was historically considered an illness). 
 188. See, e.g., “Therapies” to Change Sexual Orientation Lack Medical Justification and 
Threaten Health, PAN AM. HEALTH ORG., http://new.paho.org/hq/index.php?option 
=com_content&view=article&id=6803&Itemid=1926 (last updated May 18, 2012, 6:43 
AM) [hereinafter “Therapies”] (calling homosexuality a “natural variation of human 
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this progress, a small group of therapists, led by the National Association 
for Research and Therapy of Homosexuality (NARTH), have continued 
to advocate conversion therapy for homosexual clients.189  
Most authorities have concluded that conversion therapy is 
ineffective.190  The study most frequently cited to support the 
effectiveness of conversion therapy191 was retracted by its author, Dr. 
Robert Spitzer, for methodological flaws.192  Dr. Spitzer’s original 
study used structured interviews to report that the majority of the 200 
self-selected individuals gave “reports of change from a 
predominantly or exclusively homosexual orientation before therapy 
to a predominantly or exclusively heterosexual orientation in the past 
year.”193  As part of his retraction, Dr. Spitzer also issued an apology 
to “any gay person who wasted time and energy . . . because they 
believed that I had proven that reparative therapy works.”194 
While conversion therapy has not been demonstrated to be 
effective, its harms have been documented.  In addition to anecdotal 
reports of patients attempting suicide as a result of undergoing 
conversion therapy,195 researchers have published larger studies on 
                                                          
sexuality”); see also Lydia Saad, U.S. Acceptance of Gay/Lesbian Relations Is the New 
Normal, GALLUP (May 14, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/154634/Acceptance-
Gay-Lesbian-Relations-New-Normal.aspx (presenting polling results showing fifty-four 
percent of American adults consider gay relationships morally acceptable). 
 189. See, e.g., About NARTH, NAT’L ASSOC. FOR RES. & THERAPY HOMOSEXUALITY, 
http://www.narth.com/menus/mission.html#!about2/c1vor (last visited Nov. 19, 
2013) (describing NARTH as a “professional and scientific organization 
dedicated to the service of persons who experience unwanted homosexual 
(same-sex) attractions”). 
 190. See, e.g., APA Reiterates Position on Reparative Therapies, 36 PSYCHIATRIC NEWS 34 
(2001), http://psychnews.psychiatryonline.org/newsarticle.aspx?articleid=103194 
(encouraging additional research into the risks and benefits of conversion therapy). 
 191. Robert L. Spitzer, Can Some Gay Men and Lesbians Change Their Sexual 
Orientation? 200 Participants Reporting a Change from Homosexual to Heterosexual 
Orientation, 32 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 403 (2003). 
 192. Robert L. Spitzer, Spitzer Reassesses His 2003 Study of Reparative Therapy of 
Homosexuality, 41 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 757, 757 (2012).  Spitzer felt the fatal flaw 
in his study was the inability to validate the subjects’ reported sexual orientation.  Id.  
Other perceived flaws were that most subjects were not a representative sample of 
patients but instead were involved in “transformational ministries,” and bisexuality 
was not considered a valid sexual orientation.  B.A. Robinson, An Analysis of Dr. 
Spitzer’s 2001 Study About Whether Adults Can Change Sexual Orientation, ONT. CONSULTANTS 
ON RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE, http://www.religioustolerance.org/hom_spit.htm (last updated 
Oct. 6, 2012). 
 193. Spitzer, supra note 191, at 403. 
 194. Spitzer, supra note 192, at 757.  It is interesting to note that Spitzer does 
not acknowledge that conversion therapy can harm clients, only that it may have 
been a waste of their time.  See id. (apologizing to any member of the gay 
community who wasted time undergoing conversion therapy without 
acknowledging the associated harms). 
 195. See, e.g., Darin Squire, My Ex Ex-Gay Story, NEW DIRECTIONS MINISTRIES OF CAN., 
http://www.newdirection.ca/my-ex-ex-gay-story (last updated Apr. 1, 2013) 
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the array of physical and psychological harms that can be suffered by 
conversion therapy patients.196  Individuals who have undergone 
conversion therapy report a variety of harms, including suicide 
attempts, heavy substance abuse, and risky sexual activity.197  
Psychological harms included depression and suicide attempts when 
the patient failed to change sexual orientation.198  Social harms 
included problems with romantic relationships, difficulties 
maintaining lasting interpersonal relationships, and family strife.199  
Additionally, because patients frequently undergo conversion therapy 
due to religious concerns, failed therapy can lead to “(a) complete 
loss of faith, (b) sense of betrayal by religious leaders, (c) anger at 
clinicians who introduced punitive and shaming concepts of God, 
and (d) excommunication.”200 
In addition to the harm individuals undergoing therapy 
experience, conversion therapy can cause hardship for entire 
families.  Parents with no mental health expertise are often the force 
compelling minors to enter conversion therapy.201  While parents 
have a right to oversee the upbringing of their children,202 the 
availability of an ineffective therapy aimed at changing an immutable 
characteristic misleads parents by perpetuating their false belief that 
homosexuality is changeable.203  The belief in the mutability of sexual 
orientation leads some parents to question their role in their child’s 
sexual orientation and can contribute to parental rejection of the 
child.204  Reaction to this parental rejection may ultimately lead to the 
child’s homelessness, prostitution, substance abuse, or HIV 
                                                          
(describing the author’s difficulty reconciling his homosexuality with New 
Direction’s reparative therapy leading him to attempt suicide). 
 196. See Shidlo & Schroeder, supra note 1, at 253 (noting psychological harm 
including suicidal gestures, social and interpersonal harms from difficulty with 
interpersonal relationships, and physical harms from unsafe sex and substance abuse). 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. at 254.  Other psychological harms reported included blaming all the 
hardship in their lives on their sexual orientation and the development of 
psychological impotence and other sexual dysfunctions.  Id. at 255. 
 199. Id.  Some individuals also reported being encouraged by their therapist to 
blame their parents for their sexual orientation further straining family relationships.  
Id. 
 200. Id. at 256. 
 201. See Sonia Renee Martin, Note, A Child’s Right to be Gay:  Addressing the 
Emotional Maltreatment of Queer Youth, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 167, 174 (1996) (discussing 
the role of parents in seeking therapy to help their homosexual children 
become heterosexual). 
 202. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (upholding parents’ 
right to hire a German teacher for their children). 
 203. See, Martin, supra note 201, at 174 (attributing parents’ belief in the mutability 
of homosexuality as one factor influencing rejection of their gay children). 
 204. Id. 
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infection.205  Ongoing conflict between parents and gay youth is also a 
frequent cause of youth suicide.206  The harms associated with 
conversion therapy have led some authors to argue that conversion 
therapy administered to children should constitute child abuse, 
allowing states to use their police powers to prosecute parents.207  
Other authors have argued for tort causes of action against 
conversion therapists.208 
No mainstream medical organization supports conversion therapy.  
In 2000, the APA reaffirmed its 1973 declassification of 
homosexuality as a mental disorder and reiterated its earlier position 
questioning conversion therapy.209  The APA recommends that 
“ethical practitioners refrain from attempts to change individuals’ 
sexual orientation, keeping in mind the medical dictum to first, do 
no harm.”210  The Pan American Health Organization has declared 
conversion therapy dangerous for patients and recommends that 
such therapies should be discouraged and providers subjected to 
sanctions.211  Other organizations have acknowledged the harm and 
stopped providing reparative therapy.212 
On September 29, 2012, California Governor Jerry Brown signed 
Senate Bill 1172 out of concern over the ineffectiveness and potential 
harms of conversion therapy.213  Senate Bill 1172 amended 
California’s Business and Professions Code to ban all mental health 
providers from providing conversion therapy to a patient less than 
eighteen years of age and defines any attempted conversion therapy 
as unprofessional conduct subject to discipline by the appropriate 
licensing authority.214  However, the law does not ban religious 
                                                          
 205. See id. at 176–78 (reviewing the evidence of harmful outcomes in gay youth). 
 206. See id. at 175 (citing a 1989 U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services report). 
 207. See generally Hicks, supra note 3, at 526 (arguing that under New York state law 
parents could be prosecuted because a “reasonably prudent parent” would not have 
a child receive a dangerous therapy). 
 208. See Gans, supra note 187, at 221 (discussing how patients can use negligent 
malpractice and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims against conversion 
therapists, but arguing for a lower threshold of proof in these types of cases). 
 209. APA Reiterates, supra note 190. 
 210. Id. 
 211. “Therapies,” supra note 188. 
 212. See Wendy Gritter, A Letter to Ex-Gay Survivors, NEW DIRECTION MINISTRIES OF 
CAN., http://www.newdirection.ca/a-letter-to-ex-gay-survivors (last visited Nov. 19, 
2013) (acknowledging that people have been harmed by New Direction’s “ex-gay 
theology,” and stating that New Direction is now purporting that people can be 
homosexual and Christian). 
 213. Buchanan, supra note 2. 
 214. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 865.  SB 1172 bans “sexual orientation change 
efforts” to include “any practices” that seeks to change sexual orientation.  Id. 
§ 865(b)(1).  The statute does not ban therapies aimed at helping minors accept 
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counseling aimed at changing sexual orientation.215  California was the 
first state to attempt such a ban.216  New Jersey subsequently passed a 
similar ban.217  Several other states are considering similar legislation.218 
Senate Bill 1172 was challenged almost immediately.  Plaintiffs in 
Welch v. Brown, a suit initiated two days after Governor Brown signed 
the bill into law, charged that the law violated the First Amendment 
right to freedom of speech for individual conversion therapists and a 
mental–health-professions student.219  A similar case, Pickup v. Brown, 
was filed by NARTH, individual therapists, and parents of conversion 
therapy patients three days later.220 
Two judges from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
California ultimately came to opposing conclusions on the cases 
challenging SB 1172.  In Welch, Judge Shubb granted a preliminary 
injunction after determining that the law was a content- and 
viewpoint-based restriction of speech.221  The judge stated that the 
regulation was unlikely to survive strict scrutiny because the 
government had only shown that conversion therapy “may” harm 
minors, and such level of review requires that the government show 
that the therapy directly causes harm to minors.222  Simultaneously, a 
request for a preliminary injunction was denied in Pickup, where 
Judge Mueller ruled that the law did not restrict expressive 
                                                          
their sexual orientation.  Id. § 865(b)(2).  Although this could include practices such 
as electroshock and hormone therapy, this Comment focuses on conversion therapy 
as that is the practice where a First Amendment challenge is relevant. 
 215. See id. § 865(a) (leaving religious positions out of the definition of mental-
health provider). 
 216. Buchanan, supra note 2. 
 217. Act Concerning the Protection of Minors from Attempts to Change Sexual 
Orientation, 2013 N.J. Sess. Laws ch. 150 (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:1-55 (West 
2013)); see also Zack Ford, Chris Christie Signs New Jersey Bill Banning Ex-Gay Therapy for 
Minors, THINK PROGRESS (Aug. 19, 2013, 9:11 AM), http://thinkprogress.org/lgbt/2013 
/08/19/2486811/chris-christie-signs-new-jersey-bill-banning-ex-gay-therapy-for-minors 
(quoting Governor Chris Christie’s statement that he “does not believe in 
conversion therapy”).  
 218. See H.B. 154, 188th Leg. (Mass. 2013) (Massachusetts); S.B. 4840, 2013 Reg. 
Sess. (N.Y. 2013) (New York); Daniel Reynolds, Pa. Reps. to Propose Bill Banning “Ex-
Gay” Therapy for Youth, ADVOCATE.COM (Sept. 17, 2013), http://www.advocate.com 
/politics/politicians/2013/09/17/pa-reps-propose-bill-banning-ex-gay-therapy-youth) 
(Pennsylvania).  Ohio is also considering a ban.  Katie McDonough, Ohio May be Next State 
to Ban Gay Conversion Therapy, SALON (Oct. 7, 2013, 12:53 PM), http://www.salon.com/2013 
/10/07/ohio_may_be_next_state_to_ban_gay_conversion_therapy.   
 219. Complaint, Welch v. Brown, supra note 8, ¶¶ 77–92. 
 220. Complaint, Pickup v. Brown, supra note 8, ¶¶ 1–12. 
 221. Welch v. Brown, 907 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1121–22 (E.D. Cal. 2012), rev’d sub 
nom. Pickup v. Brown, 728 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 222. See id. at 1119–20 (pointing out that the American Psychiatric Association 
Report relied on by legislators stated that the authors could not conclude harm 
would occur and also noting that the studies had focused on harm to adult but not 
minor patients). 
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conduct.223  The act also did not discipline a provider who informed a 
minor patient that they would benefit from conversion therapy; 
providers would only be disciplined for actually providing such 
therapy to a minor.224 
Both cases were appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which in a 
consolidated appeal affirmed Pickup and reversed Welch.225  Relying 
primarily on National Ass’n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis and 
Conant, the court held that the statute at issue regulated professional 
conduct, not speech, and was therefore permissible.226  The court 
noted that while most medical treatment involves some degree of 
speech, the First Amendment would not protect a doctor trying to 
treat a patient with a banned medication.227  The court also cited the 
well-settled principle that the First Amendment does not protect criminal 
conduct that is “merely . . . carried out” through speech.228 
II. THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE IS A MORE APPROPRIATE 
APPROACH FOR EXAMINING RESTRICTIONS ON HEALTH CARE 
PROVIDERS’ SPEECH 
If the Ninth Circuit had determined that SB 1172 was a restriction 
on speech instead of conduct, the court likely would have ruled that 
SB 1172 was an unconstitutional viewpoint-based restriction under a 
traditional strict scrutiny analysis and current case law.  The Ninth 
Circuit previously ruled in Conant that a federal restriction on health 
care providers recommending medical marijuana was an 
unconstitutional viewpoint-based restriction.229  In National Ass’n for 
the Advancement of Psychoanalysis, the Ninth Circuit upheld 
California’s restrictions on licensing mental health providers in 
part because the restrictions were content neutral—they did not 
restrict the content of therapy or the use of specific types of 
                                                          
 223. Pickup v. Brown, No. 2:12 02497 KJM EFB, 2012 WL 6021465, at *7, *26 
(E.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2012), aff’d, 728 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 224. See id. at *9 (distinguishing SB 1172 from the medical marijuana policy at 
issue in Conant and the Florida firearms law in Wollschlaeger, both of which penalized 
speech based on the topic). 
 225. Pickup v. Brown, 728 F.3d 1042, 1061 (9th Cir. 2013), rev’g Welch v. Brown, 
907 F. Supp. 2d 1102 (E.D. Cal. 2012), and aff’g Pickup v. Brown, Civ. No. 2:12 02497 
KJM EFB, 2012 WL 6021465 (E.D. Cal. Dec 4, 2012).  
 226. Id. at 1055–57. 
 227. See id. at 1055 (explaining that such reasoning would restrict states’ power to 
regulate medical care). 
 228. Id. (quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949)). 
 229. See Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 639 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming a 
permanent injunction against a state statute that regulated doctor-speech based on 
the meanings attributed by listeners). 
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therapy.230  Based partly on the results of these cases, at least one 
prominent constitutional scholar believed the Ninth Circuit was 
going to find this law unconstitutional.231 
The Supreme Court would also likely find SB 1172 
unconstitutional if the law is viewed as a restriction on speech and 
not conduct.  In Rosenberger, the Supreme Court held that a 
restriction prohibiting student religious newspapers was an 
unconstitutional viewpoint-based restriction.232  Unlike the 
restrictions on discussing abortion in a federally funded family 
planning program clinic in Rust v. Sullivan, which were ruled 
constitutional,233 the restrictions in SB 1172 are not limited to health 
care provided solely as part of government-funded services.234  
Because SB 1172 is a content-based restriction on speech, the Court 
would likely apply heightened scrutiny as it did in Sorrell, where the 
Court invalidated a content-based restriction because it did not have 
a neutral justification.235  Therefore, SB 1172 would likely be 
invalidated as an unconstitutional restriction on health care 
providers’ speech. 
However, standard strict scrutiny is not the appropriate test to use 
for restrictions on health care providers’ speech.  Because health care 
providers’ speech is more akin to commercial speech than to the 
speech of private citizens, it should only be subject to strict scrutiny if 
it is not false or misleading. The Supreme Court’s reasoning for 
                                                          
 230. See Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of 
Psychology, 228 F.3d 1043, 1055–56 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that, although the 
statute may implicate speech interests, it neither “dictate[s] what can be said” 
between doctors and patients nor suppresses speech based on message). 
 231. Eugene Volokh, District Judges Split on Whether California Ban on Sexual 
Orientation Change Therapy for Minors Is Constitutional, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 5, 
2012 10:18 AM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/12/05/district-judges-split-on-whether-
california-ban-on-sexual-orientation-change-therapy-for-minors-is-constitutional (opining 
that the approach in Welch is more in line with precedent in the Ninth Circuit). 
 232. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) 
(“The government must abstain from regulating speech when . . . the opinion or 
perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction.”). 
 233. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 177–79 (1991) (explaining that the 
restrictions on discussing abortion in a federally funded family planning clinic was 
appropriate because it was intended to ensure that government funds would only be 
used to support preventative family planning services, infertility services, and other 
related medical, informational, and educational activities).  
 234. See id. at 198–99 (explaining that the restriction on speech is not applicable 
to speech outside the federally funded project). 
 235. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2672 (2011) (discussing the 
permissibility of content-based restrictions in the commercial speech setting, while 
noting that Vermont has not demonstrated a neutral justification).  It appears that 
this was the first time that content-neutrality was discussed in the setting of 
commercial speech restrictions.  See United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 163 (2d 
Cir. 2012) (explaining that Sorrell provided guidance to the Circuit Court that was 
not available to the District Court that ruled prior to the Sorrell decision). 
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refusing to apply First Amendment protection to false or misleading 
commercial speech under the first prong of Central Hudson also 
applies to health care speech that lacks any scientific support.236  This 
single-prong approach will allow courts to weed out quackery—health 
care speech lacking any legitimate scientific support.237  However, 
unlike typical commercial speech analysis, the remaining prongs of 
Central Hudson would not apply to health care speech that has some 
scientific support.  Unlike speech within the commercial arena, 
health care therapies need to be tailored to the individual patient.238  
Legislatures do not have the expertise to make those determinations, 
which is why professionals in the field usually set their own 
standards.239  Therefore, health care providers’ speech that is not 
false or misleading continues to require full First Amendment 
protection in order to protect the doctor-patient relationship from 
inappropriate government interference. 
A. The Rationale for Reduced First Amendment Protection of Commercial 
Speech Also Applies to Health Care Providers’ Speech 
The same reasoning courts have employed to justify using 
intermediate scrutiny for commercial speech, and refraining from 
applying First Amendment protection to false or misleading 
commercial speech, applies in the health care setting.  Commercial 
speech serves a different purpose than political speech, which is why 
the former does not receive full First Amendment protection.  In 
political discourse, the First Amendment is most concerned with 
allowing everyone to participate, a concept that Yale Law Professor 
and First Amendment scholar Robert Post calls democratic 
legitimization.240  The premise is that false (or bad) ideas will be 
drowned out by the true (or good) ideas, but everyone will feel heard 
and engaged in the democratic process.241 
Courts have justified applying lower levels of First Amendment 
protection for commercial speech because such speech is not 
                                                          
 236. See infra Part II.A (noting that the state may regulate health care speech in 
the same manner it regulates commercial speech because the same justification 
underlies both:  protecting the consumer by preventing harm). 
 237. See infra Part II.B (arguing that health care speech lacking legitimate 
scientific support should be treated analogous to false and misleading speech under 
the commercial speech doctrine). 
 238. See infra Part II.C. 
 239. See supra notes 38–43 and accompanying text. 
 240. See POST, supra note 43, at 1–25 (rejecting First Amendment philosophy that 
emphasizes protections only in the context of voting and instead embracing the idea 
that “First Amendment coverage should extend to all efforts deemed normatively 
necessary for influencing public opinion”). 
 241. Id. at 21. 
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necessary to the open marketplace of ideas nor central to political 
discourse.242  The Supreme Court’s commercial speech jurisprudence 
is based on protecting the consumer rather than the speaker.243  The 
Court developed the first prong of Central Hudson because false or 
misleading commercial speech could deceive the listener.244  The 
Court reiterated the state’s ability to regulate commercial speech in 
44 Liquormart, stating that this authority arose out of the interest in 
protecting the listener.245 
Intermediate scrutiny is applied to commercial speech because the 
government traditionally regulates commercial transactions; 
therefore, the government has a stronger interest in regulating 
commercial speech in general.246  Because the state can regulate 
harmful commercial activity, the state can regulate that activity even 
when speech is a component of the activity.247  In his dissent in Central 
Hudson, Justice Rehnquist went so far as to argue for no First 
Amendment protection for the utility company’s speech because the 
utility was a highly regulated, state-created monopoly.248  He went on 
to comment that from the perspective of the First Amendment, the 
utility is more like a “state-controlled enterprise than is an ordinary 
corporation.”249  As such, the state should have more leeway in 
regulating the speech of the utility it controls.250 
As previously discussed, in some cases the Court has also upheld 
restrictions on commercial speech, noting the importance of 
                                                          
 242. See id. at 40–42 (noting that commercial speech is only useful to the listener 
when it is “reliable, rather than misleading, information”). 
 243. See id. at 42–43 (explaining that the First Amendment usually serves to 
protect the voice of the speaker, while lower levels of protection for commercial 
speech are justified by the Court’s focus on protecting the listener). 
 244. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 
557, 563 (1980) (stating the government can go as far as banning deceptive speech 
(citing Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 13, 15–16 (1979))). 
 245. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 502 (1996) (calling 
protecting consumers the “typical” reason behind greater governmental regulation 
of commercial speech). 
 246. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562 (describing the level of protection for 
commercial speech as a function of both the nature of the expression and 
governmental interest being regulated); see also 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 499, 502 
(distinguishing commercial speech as an area where the government has more 
freedom to regulate, but preventing the government from enacting an all-out ban on 
truthful commercial speech); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 
410, 428 (1993) (requiring the government to make a showing to ban commercial 
speech beyond merely classifying commercial speech as “low value”). 
 247. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (explaining that 
conduct can be made illegal even if the conduct is carried out through speech). 
 248. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 584 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (describing the 
law at issue as an economic regulation). 
 249. Id. at 587.  
 250. See id. (arguing that a state should have “broad discretion” to regulate what 
statements a public utility can make). 
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preventing harm before it occurs.  In Bates, the Court did not 
substantively address the argument that “[a]fter-the-fact action by the 
consumer” may not provide adequate protection against deceptive 
advertising.251  Instead, the Court rejected this argument because it 
contradicted others put forth by the state and because it would not 
have justified a complete ban on advertising simply to avoid the 
burden of disciplining lawyers who advertised deceptively.252  In 
Ohralik, the Court noted the state’s strong interest in preventing 
harm before it occurred when the state prohibited in-person 
solicitation of businesses by lawyers.253  In health care, as in the 
commercial arena, it is important to prevent harm before it occurs.  
This is one justification for states’ control over the licensing of health 
care providers.254 
Health care therapies, including talking therapies, do not take 
place in the marketplace of ideas and therefore do not require the 
same level of First Amendment protection as public speech.  Like 
commercial transactions and the electrical utility company in Central 
Hudson, health care is highly regulated by the states.255  In health 
care, the state’s interest is not to allow everyone to participate; this is 
clear from the fact that not everyone is permitted to enter the 
profession.  State licensing authorities can limit who can practice 
health care256 and can set educational requirements.257  Furthermore, 
they can discipline, and even bar from practicing, those providers 
who deviate from the established standards of care.258  A provider’s 
treatment of a patient with therapy is a medical intervention for 
which any speech that may be involved is only incidental to the 
purpose of treatment.  Even psychotherapy, which may consist 
entirely of speech, does not receive special First Amendment 
protection; the purpose of psychotherapy is not speechit is 
relieving emotional suffering.259  Simply having a “kernel of 
                                                          
 251. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 379 (1977) (discussing the 
difficulty a layman might have in evaluating the quality of a lawyer’s services). 
 252. See id. (commenting that each deceptive lawyer will be outnumbered by 
“thousands of others” who are not deceptive). 
 253. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 464 (1978) (describing the 
restrictions as “prophylactic measures whose objective is the prevention of harm 
before it occurs”). 
 254. See supra notes 19–24 and accompanying text (detailing how states are 
empowered to issue licenses and establish standards to regulate health care practice 
for the protection of public health). 
 255. See supra Part I.A. 
 256. 53 C.J.S. Licenses, supra note 19, § 8. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. § 82. 
 259. See Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of 
Psychology, 228 F.3d 1043, 1054 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that communications made 
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expression” in an activity such as therapy does not demand full First 
Amendment coverage.260  The speech in therapy or other health care 
settings is not the kind of speech envisioned as protected by the First 
Amendment, which is instead typically thought of as providing 
protection for political speech.261  Health care or therapeutic speech 
does not serve the role of political discourse in the marketplace of 
ideas; therefore, First Amendment protection for health care speech 
should focus on the listener, not the speaker.262 
Admittedly, there are nuances to this approach.  Some speech 
between health care providers and patients would fall outside a 
therapeutic purpose and could qualify as political discourse.  For 
example, a health care provider’s speech to a patient explaining that 
a therapy is not currently available would be protected under the 
marketplace of ideas theory because it might lead the patient to lobby 
the legislature for increased research funding to demonstrate the 
utility of the therapy.263  Robert Post gives the additional example of a 
dentist who writes a book encouraging the removal of mercury 
fillings, which would be protected speech under the marketplace of 
ideas, while the same dentist’s advice to an individual patient would 
not be protected.264 
Like Post’s dentist who provided individual advice, the health care 
provider’s speech to patients as part of treatment exists outside the 
marketplace of ideas, and therefore does not require full First 
Amendment protection.  Thus, the same reasoning the Supreme 
Court has used to justify reduced scrutiny for commercial speech also 
applies to speech in the health care setting. 
B. The First Prong of Central Hudson Weeds Out Quackery 
By applying the first prong of Central Hudson to regulations of 
health care providers’ speech, courts can weed out quackery.  Under 
                                                          
during psychoanalysis are protected by the Constitution, but may still nevertheless be 
regulated in furtherance of important state interests). 
 260. Id. (quoting City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989)). 
 261. See POST, supra note 43, at 42–43 (arguing that expert knowledge, like 
commercial speech, serves the rights of the listener, not the rights of the speaker). 
 262. See id. at 24 (differentiating between the First Amendment’s role in public 
discourse of protecting the rights of the speaker and its role in protecting the 
“dignity of the targets of speech” outside public discourse). 
 263. See Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 634 (9th Cir. 2002) (listing the district 
court’s finding that physician speech could lead to a patient petitioning the 
government for a change in marijuana laws). 
 264. See POST, supra note 43, at 12–13 (explaining why the dentist would have 
First Amendment protection against malpractice claims from a patient who 
relied on her advice in the book, but not against a claims from a patient who 
relied on individual advice). 
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that prong, courts evaluate whether the commercial speech being 
regulated is false or misleading and therefore not protected by the 
First Amendment.265 
The First Amendment protects false speech in political discourse.266  
False commercial speech, however, does not receive this level of 
protection.267  The fact that a commercial speaker can easily 
determine whether his speech is factually correct, unlike the press or 
a private citizen who may need to use multiple sources to verify the 
truth of a statement, justifies government restrictions on false or 
misleading commercial speech.268  The government can even go so 
far as to ban deceptive commercial speech.269  Allowing these 
restrictions on false or misleading commercial speech serves the 
state’s interest in preventing fraud.270 
The interest in preventing fraud in health care is just as strong 
asor stronger thanthe state’s interest in the commercial speech 
realm.271  Health care fraud carries not only the risk of economic 
harm, but can result in physical and mental harm as well.272  Thus, 
the same reasoning courts have used to support restrictions on false 
or misleading commercial speech is applicable to restrictions on 
health care providers’ speech in order to prevent fraud. 
Still, the question remains:  how should courts evaluate whether or 
not the health care providers’ speech is false or misleading?  The 
answer lies in the health care setting’s analogy to false and misleading 
speechwhether the speech lacks legitimate scientific support.  
Health care services without some scientific support have no 
therapeutic potential.  Administering these unsubstantiated services 
                                                          
 265. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 
566 (1980). 
 266. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974) (“Under the First 
Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea.”). 
 267. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563 (stating that there is no constitutional 
barrier to restricting inaccurate commercial messages). 
 268. See Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 
748, 777 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring) (noting that the principles behind libel may 
allow the government to protect the public from false advertising because 
commercial advertisers are better positioned to verify the truth of their speech). 
 269. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563 (citing Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 13, 15–
16 (1979)). 
 270. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 502 (1996). 
 271. 39A C.J.S. Health & Environment § 1 (2003) (“[T]here is no public policy 
more important than the protection of citizens from practices which may injure 
their health.”). 
 272. See Rooting Out Health Care Fraud Is Central to the Well-being of Both Our Citizens 
and the Overall Economy, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/investigate/white_collar/health-care-fraud (last visited Nov. 19, 2013) (describing 
health care fraud as costing the U.S. economy approximately $80 billion a year and 
noting that fraudulent providers are putting patients at risk). 
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is the health care equivalent of fraud, which is the harm the first 
prong of Central Hudson aims to avoid. 
Courts are able to evaluate relevant evidence and determine if 
there is any legitimate scientific support for the restricted speech.  
This approach is already used in the methodology for determining 
whether to admit scientific evidence laid out in Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.273  While admitting or rejecting expert testimony 
is different than making a constitutional determination, the same 
Daubert factors can be used.  In Daubert, the Court first defined 
scientific knowledge as more than a belief or speculation.274  
Scientific knowledge must be “ground[ed] in the methods and 
procedures of science.”275  The Court then stated that in choosing to 
allow expert scientific testimony, judges must determine whether the 
methodology used to develop the scientific testimony is valid.276  The 
Court delineated four factors judges could consider, including 
whether:  the science can be tested,277 it is published in peer-reviewed 
literature,278 there is knowledge of error rates,279 and the science has 
gained “general acceptance.”280  The Court expanded on the 
importance of acceptance in the scientific community by stating “a 
known technique which has been able to attract only minimal support 
within the community, may properly be viewed with skepticism.”281 
Courts can also rely on experts in the relevant discipline.  In his 
dissent in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n,282 a case involving 
restrictions on the sale of violent video games to minors, Justice 
Breyer noted that while most judges, including himself, lacked 
scientific expertise, public health professionals who had that 
expertise found a significant risk from violent video games.283  Robert 
Post argues that courts should use the methods of a scientific 
                                                          
 273. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 274. Id. at 590. 
 275. Id. 
 276. See id. at 592–93 (instructing judges to do a “preliminary assessment” of the 
scientific validity). 
 277. See id. at 593 (stating the testing of hypotheses is the basis of the scientific 
method). 
 278. See id. (describing the aspect of submitting for peer review, even if not 
published, as “a component of ‘good science’”). 
 279. See id. at 594 (citing cases examining the error rate of voice identification 
techniques). 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 282. 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). 
 283. See id. at 2769 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting position statements from 
several public health, medical, and psychological associations). 
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discipline to evaluate the validity of that discipline’s knowledge.284  
Only that discipline’s methodology can determine the validity of work 
within the field.285  The Supreme Court recognized this in School 
Board v. Arline,286 when it endorsed the idea that courts should 
defer to public health officials in determining whether a 
contagious disease created a risk to others, rather than making an 
independent determination.287 
In Daubert, the Supreme Court expressed its confidence that judges 
could make these scientific validity evaluations of experts.288  Its 
confidence was well-founded as, on remand, the Ninth Circuit used 
the criteria to determine that the plaintiffs’ experts did not qualify as 
scientific experts.289  The Ninth Circuit relied on several factors 
including that the experts had not submitted their research for peer 
review during the more than ten years of litigation, had not been 
doing the research prior to being hired for litigation, and in one 
case, had made an assertion without a testable hypothesis.290 
The fact that courts have acknowledged the presence of scientific 
controversydemonstrating at least some evidence of legitimate 
scientific supportin several of the health care First Amendment 
cases previously discussed is further evidence that courts are capable 
of determining what constitutes legitimate scientific debate.291   For 
instance, in his Conant concurrence, Judge Kozinski used over two 
                                                          
 284. See POST, supra note 43, at 54–59 (arguing that applying the disciplinary 
methods by which the expert knowledge is defined is the only way to judicially 
protect “democratic competence”). 
 285. See id. (using the example of a dental regulation and asserting that “[a] court 
will have no option but to apply the authoritative methods and truths of medical 
service in order to determine whether prohibiting the dentist’s advice will trigger 
First Amendment review”). 
 286. 480 U.S. 273 (1987). 
 287. See id. at 287–88 (adopting the American Medical Association’s position with 
respect to how a district court should make factual determinations when considering 
discrimination claims of a person with a contagious disease). 
 288. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592–93 (1993) 
(suggesting several criteria by which a judge can make this determination, including 
whether the theory or technique has been tested, whether it has been peer reviewed, 
and what the rate of error is). 
 289. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1322 (9th Cir. 
1995) (ruling testimony for the plaintiffs was inadmissible because necessary 
changes to meet the evidentiary standard would “undermine any attempt to show 
that these findings were ‘derived by the scientific method’” (quoting Daubert, 509 
U.S. at 590))). 
 290. Id. at 1318–19. 
 291. See supra Part I.B (discussing the Court’s experiences adjudicating laws 
related to the use of cannabis for therapeutic purposes, the doctor-patient privilege 
in inquiring about owning firearms, and informing individuals about the increased 
risk of suicide for those who get abortions). 
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pages to discuss the science behind medical marijuana.292  He noted 
the presence of a “genuine difference of expert opinion” with 
significant evidence on both sides of the debate.293  Similarly, in 
another case, the Eighth Circuit took eleven pages to explore the 
scientific uncertainty surrounding abortion and the increased risk of 
suicide in order to affirm the validity of disclosure language required 
by a South Dakota statute.294 
Similar to identifying whether commercial speech is false or 
misleading, courts can determine if health care therapies have any 
legitimate scientific support using the same approach used to 
evaluate potential expert scientific testimony.  The theories lacking 
legitimate scientific support would, like false or misleading 
commercial speech, lack First Amendment protection.  However, 
speech with some scientific support would continue to receive First 
Amendment protection. 
C. Health Care Providers’ Speech Surviving the First Prong of Central 
Hudson Should Be Subject to Strict Scrutiny 
If a court finds that the regulations on health care speech are 
truthful and non-misleading under the first prong of Central Hudson, 
traditional strict scrutiny would be the appropriate test to apply.  
Applying strict scrutiny would continue to protect the doctor-patient 
relationship from inappropriate state intervention.  While the 
arguments likening such speech to commercial speech might suggest 
that intermediate scrutiny would be appropriate for examining 
restrictions on truthful and non-misleading health care providers’ 
speech, the risk of the government suppressing this truthful speech 
demands the highest level of First Amendment protection.295  Under 
the alternative, intermediate scrutiny, the government could restrict 
truthful and non-misleading health care providers’ speech if those 
restrictions directly advanced a substantial government interest and 
were no more extensive than necessary.296 
                                                          
 292. See Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 641–43 (9th Cir. 2002) (Kozinski, J., 
concurring) (referencing the various studies conducted by the National Institute of 
Medicine, National Academy of Sciences and the federal government on the 
scientific evidence behind the therapeutic application of cannabis). 
 293. Id. at 643. 
 294. See Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889, 893–905 
(8th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (evaluating the term “increased risk” within the vast array 
of peer-reviewed medical literature discussing abortion and suicide rates). 
 295. See Conant, 309 F.3d at 637 (emphasizing that professional speech requires 
the highest level of First Amendment protection (quoting Fla. Bar v. Went For It, 
Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 634 (1995))). 
 296. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 
566 (1980). 
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There are several reasons intermediate scrutiny would not provide 
sufficient protection.  First, patients and providers need open 
communication,297 without which providers may not have all the 
information necessary to treat the patient.298  The importance of 
open communication is demonstrated by the presence of the doctor-
patient privilege, which exists under common law and allows patients 
to speak openly with their doctor without fearing the doctor will be 
called to testify against them.299  Second, patients need to be able to 
trust their provider.300  This trust is essential because patients look to 
their providers for expert judgment upon which they can rely.301  
Third, providers need to be able to offer all appropriate therapies to 
individual patients.302 
In addition, the unique nature of the relationship between doctor 
and patient, a defining feature of the health care profession, requires 
that the health care provider be able to give individualized advice.303  
Patients may have different goals, such as prolonging life or reducing 
pain and suffering, and these goals may require diverse treatments.304  
Additionally, patients may respond to treatments differently or 
require adjustments in their treatments. 
It is not appropriate for legislatures to make broad determinations 
regarding which scientifically supported potential therapies are 
appropriate for individual patients.  Most legislators lack health care 
expertise, which is why professional standards are set by the state 
licensing authority and not by the legislature.305  As previously 
                                                          
 297. See Conant, 309 F.3d at 636 (describing open communication as an “integral 
component” of medicine). 
 298. Id. (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980)). 
 299. See id. (explaining that the importance of this privileged communication is 
such that it has been adopted by the courts in common law and through the rules of 
evidence (citing FED. R. EVID. 501))). 
 300. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 218 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(noting that patients put “complete confidence, and often their very lives” in the 
hands of physicians). 
 301. See POST, supra note 43, at 45 (asserting malpractice liability enforces 
“expert pronouncements”). 
 302. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 214 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (calling it an ethical 
responsibility). 
 303. See Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 232 (1985) (White, J., concurring in the 
result) (defining a professional as one who works directly with a client on that 
client’s behalf). 
 304. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 214 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (asserting that patient 
autonomy is only enabled when patients have the information necessary to make an 
autonomous choice). 
 305. See Semler v. Or. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 294 U.S. 608, 611 (1935) 
(commenting that state regulation occurs through administrative boards). 
FULTZ.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE) 1/9/2014  3:46 PM 
2013] IF IT QUACKS LIKE A DUCK 603 
discussed, it takes training and expertise in a discipline to critically 
evaluate the quality of work in that discipline.306 
As an example of the potential problem in applying only 
intermediate scrutiny, a court might find that the federal 
government’s restriction on recommending medical marijuana could 
be a restriction that is no more extensive than necessary to directly 
advance the government’s substantial interest in reducing illegal drug 
use.  This would allow the legislature to prevent a physician from 
recommending medical marijuana for an end-stage AIDS patient with 
severe weight loss and lack of appetite or a cancer patient with 
uncontrollable pain in a state where such use is legal under state law.307 
Therefore, while the similarities to commercial speech might 
suggest that intermediate scrutiny is appropriate for truthful and 
non-misleading health care providers’ speech, intermediate scrutiny 
does not provide sufficient protection.  Applying strict scrutiny to 
truthful and non-misleading speech would be in line with the general 
approach the Supreme Court has taken with health care provider 
speech in the past.308  In addition, applying strict scrutiny would be 
consistent with the Court’s recent approach to content-based 
restrictions on commercial speech as articulated in Sorrell.309  For 
these reasons, speech that survives the first prong of Central Hudson 
should continue to be analyzed under traditional strict scrutiny. 
D. Senate Bill 1172 Would Be Upheld Under this “Single-Prong” Approach 
When examined under this proposed single-prong approach, SB 
1172 would be upheld as a constitutional exercise of the state’s police 
powers for protecting the health and well-being of minors even if it is 
viewed as a restriction on speech.  Under the first prong analysis of 
Central Hudson, the “therapeutic” speech affected by SB 1172 would 
be found false and misleading.  Conversion therapy would fail this 
analysis on several of the Daubert criteria.310  First, conversion therapy 
                                                          
 306. See POST, supra note 43, at 54–59 (examining how courts would determine 
whether homeopathic medicine is a scientific discipline). 
 307. See Marijuana, AM. CANCER SOC’Y, http://www.cancer.org/treatment/treatments 
andsideeffects/complementaryandalternativemedicine/herbsvitaminsandminerals/
marijuana (last updated July 13, 2012) (explaining that marijuana is used for pain 
and appetite stimulation for people with AIDS or cancer). 
 308. See supra Parts I.B.1 and I.B.2 (exploring the protections the Supreme Court 
has afforded regarding medical marijuana and firearms). 
 309. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2672 (2011) (finding 
Vermont’s restrictions on the sale of prescribing data for pharmaceutical 
marketing purposes as an unconstitutional content-based restriction subject to 
heightened scrutiny). 
 310. See supra notes 273–281 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 
Daubert criteria. 
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lacks general acceptance; it is not supported by any mainstream 
medical or psychological organization.311  Instead, supporters of 
conversion therapy are primarily religious groups.312  The Supreme 
Court has previously been suspicious of scientific support put forward 
only by church-based scientific organizations.313  The only reportedly 
professional association supporting conversion therapy is NARTH.  
However, few people consider NARTH a legitimate scientific 
organization.314  Second, conversion therapy has never been proven 
effective in a methodologically valid study,315 but it has been 
demonstrated as harmful.316  As a result, there are few primary 
research publications supporting conversion therapy in the scientific 
literature outside those published by NARTH-affiliated authors.317 
Given the lack of general acceptance of conversion therapy as a 
legitimate therapeutic approach and the lack of supportive evidence 
in the scientific literature, courts will likely be skeptical about its 
                                                          
 311. See supra notes 209–212 and accompanying text (arguing that experts have 
found conversion therapy harmful to patients). 
 312. See, e.g., The Truth About “Converting” Gay People, OUTFRONT MINN., 
http://www.outfront.org/library/exgay/facts (last visited Nov. 19, 2013) (describing 
these “ex-gay” groups as being “religious-based” or “quasi-mental-health” groups); see 
also Hicks, supra note 3, at 508 (discussing religious approaches used in addition to 
therapy to attempt to change sexual orientation).  Exodus International, one of the 
largest Christian-based organizations advocating conversion therapy recently issued 
an apology to the gay community and then shut down a few hours later.  Ed Payne, 
Group Apologizes to Gay Community, Shuts Down “Cure” Ministry, CNN (July 8, 2013, 2:04 
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/20/us/exodus-international-shutdown. 
 313. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 601–02 (1987) (Powell, J., concurring) 
(discussing the lack of scientific methodology evidence and the groups’ reliance on 
church doctrine in declaring themselves creation scientists). 
 314. See, e.g., Ryan Lenz, NARTH Becomes Main Source for Anti-Gay “Junk Science,” 
INTELL. REP., Spring 2012, at 2, available at http://www.splcenter.org/get-
informed/intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/2012/spring/queer-science (“In fact, 
every major American medical authority has concluded that there is no scientific 
support for NARTH’s view, and many have expressed concern that reparative 
therapy can cause harm.”).  
 315. See supra notes 190–192 and accompanying text (noting that the most 
commonly cited study was retracted by its author). 
 316. See supra notes 194–208 and accompanying text (describing the documented 
harms of conversion therapy). 
 317. For example, a search of PubMed for the term (“sexual orientation”) AND 
(“change efforts” OR “change therapy” OR “conversion therapy”) revealed 10 studies, only 
one of which is primary research on homosexual patients.  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih 
.gov/pubmed/?term=(%22sexual+orientation%22)+AND+(%22change+efforts%22+
OR+%22change+therapy%22+OR+%22conversion+therapy%22) (last accessed Sept. 
26, 2013).  PubMed is the U.S. National Library of Medicine’s link to more than 23 
million citations from biomedical literature.  PubMed Help, PUBMED.GOV, http://www 
.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK3827/#pubmedhelp.FAQs (last visited Nov. 19, 2013).  
The primary author of the article, Retrospective Self-reports of Changes in Homosexual 
Orientation:  A Consumer Survey of Conversion Therapy Patients, Dr. Joseph Nicolosi, is a 
member of the Board of Directors of NARTH.  NARTH Officers and Board Members, NAT’L 
ASSOC. FOR RES. & THERAPY OF HOMOSEXUALITY, http://www.narth.com/2011/11/narth-
officers#!ourteam/cqn6 (last visited Nov. 19, 2013).  
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validity.318  If courts apply the professional practices of mainstream 
psychology, as Robert Post argues they should, they will likely 
determine that NARTH “does not itself produce constitutionally 
valuable knowledge” and would therefore find the organization’s 
evidence invalid.319 
Under this single-prong approach, once courts have determined 
that conversion therapy is not a legitimate therapeutic approach, SB 
1172 would only be subject to rational basis review.320  Under rational 
basis review, a statute is constitutional if it is rationally related to a 
legitimate state interest.321  Protecting minors from harm is a 
legitimate state interest.322  Banning conversion therapy for minors is 
rationally related to that legitimate interest because the harms of 
conversion therapy have been demonstrated.323  Therefore, because 
SB 1172 is rationally related to a legitimate state interest, it would be 
a constitutional exercise of the state’s police powers under rational 
basis review. 
CONCLUSION 
Giving full First Amendment coverage to health care providers’ 
speech has served to protect the doctor-patient relationship from 
attempted content- and viewpoint-based restrictions.  This approach 
has worked well for speech supported by some scientific evidence, even 
when there is a lack of scientific consensus.  However, when that speech 
involves quackery, the traditional use of strict scrutiny can undermine 
the states’ attempts at using their police powers to protect citizens. 
The same reasoning and approach the Supreme Court has used for 
analyzing commercial speech under the First Amendment should 
apply to health care providers’ speech within the doctor-patient 
relationship.  Using the first prong of Central Hudson, this single-
prong approach allows courts to identify the health care equivalent of 
                                                          
 318. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993) (listing 
“general acceptance” as one criteria courts should consider in determining whether 
proposed scientific testimony is valid). 
 319. See POST, supra note 43, at 56–57 (describing how courts might use 
“‘established’ scientific discipline” to determine that astrological advice and 
homeopathic medicine do not require First Amendment protection). 
 320. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 443–44 
(1993) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (summarizing the Court’s history of 
commercial speech jurisprudence). 
 321. Cf. Armour v. City of Indianapolis, 132 S. Ct. 2073, 2080 (2012) (defining 
rational basis review in the equal protection setting). 
 322. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2736 (2011) (explaining 
that the State possesses the authority and power to protect children from harm). 
 323. See supra notes 194–208 and accompanying text for a discussion of the harms 
of conversion therapy. 
FULTZ.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE) 1/9/2014  3:46 PM 
606 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:567 
false and misleading commercial speechquackery.  Therefore, for 
the same reasons false and misleading commercial speech is excluded 
from First Amendment protection, quackery should be excluded 
from such protection.  This approach provides a better balance 
between protecting the First Amendment rights of providers as 
speakers (and therefore patients as listeners) with the right of States 
to use their police powers to protect citizens from harm. 
California’s attempt at banning conversion therapy for minors with 
SB 1172 provides a case to demonstrate the benefits of this approach.  
Under traditional strict scrutiny, SB 1172 would likely be ruled 
unconstitutional if viewed as a restriction on speech.  If SB 1172 was 
ruled unconstitutional, mental health providers would be allowed to 
continue to provide conversion therapy and harm patients.  Under 
the proposed single-prong approach, SB 1172 would be upheld as 
constitutional, thereby preventing these harms. 
The approach articulated here fits within the broader scheme of 
First Amendment jurisprudence.  First Amendment protection of 
political speech serves to protect the speaker in the marketplace of 
ideas, where society’s interest is in making sure all voices are heard.324  
Commercial speech andas this Comment argueshealth care 
providers’ speech are permissibly regulated under the First 
Amendment in order to protect the listener.325  This protection serves 
the societal interest in health care:  finding the “truth” in diagnosis 
and treatment for the individual patient while preventing quackery 
from harming patients. 
                                                          
 324. See POST, supra note 43, at 24 (noting that the First Amendment is meant to 
protect the autonomy of the speaker in public discourse). 
 325. See id. (arguing for the government’s role in properly adjudicating and 
legislating First Amendment issues to protect both the speaker and the targeted). 
